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II. INTRODUCTION
This Petition and Motion for a panel rehearing is made pursuant to Rule 35 and the
undersigned certifies that it is presented in good faith and not for the purposes of delay.

III. PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE CASE
The Appellant filed two (2) separate appeals regarding her divorce. The Appellant,
in her briefs, raised a number of legal issues. The errors of law should have been addressed
even if the court properly refused to review the ultimate Findings of Fact. The panel held
that during the hearing, the Appellant intentionally waived the separate errors of law raised
in the appeal. The Appellant did not intend to concede the errors of law identified in her
Briefs. After reviewing the tape, the concession was inadvertent and was a statement of the
Appellant's position which was directed at a narrow issue then being addressed. It was not
intended to be a general waiver regarding all legal issues raised in the appeal. John A.
Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Company 831 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
INVOLVING MATTERS OF LAW.
1.

The Court reviews issues of law under the correction of error standard. David

Winters v. JoAnne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218.
2.

The Court reviews the application of the law to a known set of facts under the

correction of error standard. Hope H. Openshaw v. Richard C. Openshaw 639 P.2d 177
(Utah 1981): Patricia G.Smith v. Scott G.Smith 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): Patricia
Boals v. Jack M. Boals 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983).
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3.

The Court reviews the award or the denial of alimony to a spouse under the

abuse of discretion standard provided it is exercised within the proscribed parameters and
provided detailed Findings of Fact are made on critical matters. Michele Bell v. Harold Bell
810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
4.

Failure to enter specific Findings of Fact on a critical issue in a case constitutes

as an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. Eva L. Jeffries v. Donald L. Jeffries 752 P.2d
909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The adequacy of the Findings of Fact is a matter of law.
5.

The review court will strictly apply the governing law in a contempt

proceeding. Nellie Lovett v. Continental Bank 4 Ut.2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1955).
6.

The Court reviews an award of attorney's fees under the abuse of discretion

standard. An exception applies when the fee claim is not contested by specific evidence.
Govert Copier Painting v. Craig Van Leeuwen 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
V. THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR A REHEARING
The Trial Court substantially deviated from the established rules of law. With respect
to the issues of contempt, the court failed to decide or misapplied the following:
1.

Whether or not the District Court obtained jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter of the proceeding as required by established case law, rule of law, and the
governing statutory law that must be applied. (Appellant's Brief pp. 16 and 17).
2.

Whether, on account of procedural matters regarding the hearing, the Appellant

was afforded "due process of law" due to the Trial Court's failure to follow and strictly apply
the contempt statute as interpreted by controlling case law. (Appellant's Brief p. 17).
-2-

3.

Whether or not there existed, as a matter of law, a clear, specific, and

unambiguous order sufficient to support the claims of contempt. (Appellant's Brief p. 24).
4.

Whether the Findings of Facts, as entered by the Trial Court, are adequate to

establish the basic elements of contempt as a matter of law. (Appellant's Brief p. 25).
5.

Whether the court procedurally and substantively complied with the affirmative

law as set forth in UCA §78-32-1 et. seq. (Appellant Briefs pp. 16-22).
6.

Whether the failure to file an Affidavit as required by law is a procedural bar

to the proceedings and whether this substantive legal protection was afforded the accused.
(Appellant's Brief pp. 17-21).
With respect to the divorce, the court failed to decide or misapplied the following:
1.

Whether or not the order of spousal support was vacated in violation of

statutory law and the established case law. (Appellant's Brief p. 29; Reply Brief p. 23).
2.

Whether or not the court's Findings of Facts, as entered, are adequate as a

matter law with respect to the income of the parties. (Appellant's Brief pp. 36-41).
3.

Whether or not the Child Support Guidelines requires the parties, as a matter

of law, to verify and substantiate their income with the type of evidence that affirmative law
otherwise requires the party to have and possess and whether this failure was clear error.
(Appellant's Brief pp. 30-36, 39-41).
4.

Whether or not the adverse inference rule was identified and then properly

applied in this case by the Trial Court. (Appellant's Brief pp. 32-36).
5.

Whether or not, based upon the facts as actually entered by the Court, the
•3-

Respondent should have been required to pay alimony in the sum previously set by the court
in the sum of $400.00 as a matter of law. (Appellant's Brief pp. 43-48; Reply Brief p. 17).
6.

Whether the Findings of Facts, as entered by the court, to determine issues of

child support and alimony are adequate as a matter of law. (Appellant's Brief pp. 36-41,48).
7.

Whether the Findings of Fact are adequate as a matter of law to show that the

Respondent's income had decreased from a conceded $5,000.00 per month to $2,500.00 as
required by existing case law. (Appellant's Brief pp. 44-48).
8.

The failure to award the wife all of her claimed attorney's fees as a matter of

law and based upon the existing case law. (Appellant Briefs p. 53; Reply Brief p. 22).
VI. THE REVIEW OF SPECIFIC ERRORS OF LAW
The Standard of Review on Appeal is Strict Regarding Issues of Contempt.
The issue of contempt requires the strict application of the law to the facts. Nellie
Lovett v. Continental Bank 4 Ut.2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1955); Emeline Young v.
George O. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (Utah 1880). Contempt must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. This means that the Findings of Fact, as ultimately entered by the Trial
Court, must be clear, specific, and entered on all of the elements of the cause of action.
The Findings of Fact on contempt are contained in the final order. (Record pp. 13461350). The Findings of Fact, as entered by the Trial Court, fails to address all of the
elements of contempt and therefore, they are inadequate as a matter of law. (Record pp.
1322-1326, and 1349, 1J6). (Appellant's Brief p. 26).
The Findings of Facts must be made on all of the elements of the claim or it is
-4-

reversible error and is an abuse of discretion. State of Utah v. Don Bartholomew 85 Ut. 94,
38 P.2d 753 (Utah 1934).
The Evidentiary Hearing on the Contempt Allegation
was Procedurally and Substantively Defective as a Matter of Law.
The evidentiary hearing regarding contempt as conducted by the Trial Judge was
improper as a matter of law. (Appellant Brief pp. 21-22; Reply Brief pp. 4-5). The
evidentiary hearing was defective for the following legal reasons: (i) no prima facie case of
contempt was set forth in the initiating pleadings and which existed in admissible form and
in proper content; (ii) the accused was required to present her defenses to the allegations
before the accuser put on any required evidence; (iii) the clear mandatory provisions of UC A
§§78-32-3 and 9 had not been satisfied; (iv) the specific written order regarding the 1999
Halloween contempt claim was never identified in the pleadings or referenced during the
trial; (v) the court had already judged the anticipated evidence; and (vi) the record fails to
prove that the father showed up on Halloween to pick up the child and therefore, the wife
cannot be guilty of any denial of the visitation. (Contempt Trial pp. 51-55).
The Trial Court must follow certain statutory procedures when contempt is an issue.
The Appellee acknowledged the failure to comply with UCA §78-32-1 et. seq. (Appellee
Brief p. 23). The rule of law on procedural matters is not optional when it comes to matters
of civil or criminal contempt. Emeline Young v. George O. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (Utah 1880).
These laws confer procedural and substantive rights on the accused. Maureen Burgers v.
William Maiben 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). The accused is entitled to know the specific
facts and witnesses on which the claim is based. This can only be accomplished with a
-5-

detailed, fact sensitive affidavit based upon first hand knowledge as contemplated by the
statute. The accused cannot be required to present any defense before the claimant has
presented a prima facie case. (Contempt Trial pp. 43 and 54-56). The procedure used by the
Trial Court violates the provisions of UCA §78-32-9 and violates the constitutional
protections of "due process of law." (Appellant's Brief pp. 21-24).
The state and federal courts have made it clear that a person legal and constitutional
rights are to be strictly observed in a contempt proceeding. In Re: Oliver 333 US 257, 68
S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed 682 (1948); Cooke v. USA 267 US 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed 767
(1925); John G. Powers v. Marvin S. Taylor 14 Ut.2d 118, 378 P.2d 519 (Utah 1963);
Maureen Burgers v. William Maiben 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).
The trial was a substantial deviation from established case law and procedure.
The District Court did not Properly Obtain
Contempt Jurisdiction over the Respondent.
The Appellant objected to the Court's contempt jurisdiction on several grounds.
These are issues of law and not fact. (Appellant's Brief pp. 16-21).
The Appellee did not challenge, during the appeal, the applicability of the mandatory
provisions of UCA §78-32-1 et. seq. The Appellee fiirther admitted that no supporting
Affidavits were filed.

(Record pp. 1172-1189, 1221-1231; Appellee Brief p. 17). The

"verified" memorandum does not meet the minimum content requirements for an affidavit
or the minimum legal requirements of UCA §78-32-3. The affidavit must, on its face,
indicate that the affiant has firsthand knowledge about which he is testifying about, that the
evidence being offered is in admissible form, and the acts which constitute the contempt are
-6-

set forth with particularity. Emeline Young v. George O. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (Utah 1880).
These were wholly lacking in this case. (Record pp. 1172-1189, 1221-1231).
For example, an Affidavit containing improper heresay or opinion testimony may not
be relied upon and is defective as a matter of law. J.B. Walker v. Rocky Mountain
Recreation 29 Ut.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973). More importantly, an Affidavit that
merely recites unsubstantiated conclusions or fails to state evidentiary facts is also legally
defective. Shawn William v. Kenneth Melbv 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). The pleadings
submitted to initiate the contempt matters violated all of these rules of law.
These legal defenses were not waived, but were preserved for review. (Record pp.
1246-1249; Contempt Trial pp. 50-51 and 54). The rulings on these legal issues represents
a substantial deviation from the established law and procedure on this subject.
The Use of a Mailing Certificate to Commence an Independent Action
Regarding Contempt was Improper As a Matter of Law.
One of the procedural objections that was made and briefed in this case was the
"mailing" of the contempt pleadings to the accused's attorney of record and the failure to
employ personal service. (Record p. 1247, ff 1 and 2; Contempt Trial p. 50, lines 15-18;
Appellant Brief pp. 16-17, and 20). The Appellee concedes that each Order to Show Cause
was not personally "served" and no "return of service" was filed as required by Rule 4102(2)(A) and (B) of the Code of Judicial Administration. (Appellee Brief p. 18).
Contempt is an independent legal action. This has been the rule of law for over 120
years. Emeline Young v. George O. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (Utah 1880). The failure to obtain
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personal jurisdiction over the person as part of a legal proceeding is a matter of law for the
court to determine. The only case that has allowed the pleadings to be "mailed" is where a
party has previously been shown to be evading service of legal process. Bruno D' Aston v.
Dorothy D'Aston 790 P.2d 590 (UtahCt. App. 1990). (Recordpp. 1290, and 1266-1293 [i.e.
the return of service in the D'Aston case as to evading service of legal process]). The
D'Aston case did not overrule the prior established case law. (Appellant's Brief pp. 17-21).
The Trial Court's ruling was a substantial deviation from the established case law.
A Person Can Only be Held in Contempt for Violating
a Specific and Clear Order of the Court as a Matter of Law.
The Appellee claimed that a clear order existed as to Halloween 1999. (Appellee
Brief pp. 23-24). There is no doubt that the Decree of Divorce had not been entered on the
dates of the alleged improper conduct. (Record p. 1130). Therefore, as a matter of law, the
Decree of Divorce cannot be used to support the contempt citation. The Appellee then
claimed that some prior order must therefore govern. (Appellee Brief p. 24). However, the
specific order that was allegedly violated regarding Halloween was never identified.
As to the other visitation matters, the language of the Decree of Divorce itself makes
a contempt citation improper as a matter of law. (Appellant's Brief pp. 24-25). The Decree
of Divorce contains very unique language and confers specific rights and prerogatives upon
the children that both parents are ordered to obey. The court cannot unilaterally change or
misapply the terms of the Order. (Contempt Trial p. 43, lines 16-24; and p. 46, lines 14-20).
Therefore, Mrs. Miller's conduct cannot be contemptuous as a matter of law. Whether an

-8-

Uidcr is cleai and specific is a matter of law. (Appellant's Brief p. 24).
Spouse Must Be Held Accountable
Income Not Adequately
Disclosed or Verified by the Recipient as a Matter of Law.
Il III
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Court). This is a legal duty apart from the adverse inference rule. The Trial Court's failure
to require this information is wrong as a matter of law and was clear error. It results in a
substantial deviation from the established case and noncompliance w ith affirmative law.
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royalties, (xi) partnership income, (xii) Subchapter " S " income, and (xiii) estate income.
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income must be identified by the recipient. StevenJNeil Breinholt v. Jan E JBreinholt 905
P.2d 877 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The sources and amounts ot income is not limited to those
that are taxable tor tederal income tax accounting purposes. IIIA ^ / 8-4> / M 4)(111.
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the discretion of the Trial Court to find (based upon the admitted evidence) that a pnrt\ mm
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IIII I 1111

be earning greater income than what is claimed or that the party had a greater ability to earn.
Jeanette Osguthorpe v. Jerry Osguthorpe 804 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Glen P. Willev
v. Rosalind A. Willev (II) 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The court's discretion on
this matter is not without some legal limits. This exercise of the discretion is evaluated by
reference to the court's Findings of Fact. The court's Findings of Facts, as entered, do not
disclose why Mr. Miller's earnings ability had decreased by 60%. Mr. Miller conceded that
he historically earned $5,000.00 per month (Divorce Trial p. 289), but at the time of trial was
$2,000.00. (Divorce Trial pp. 50,209-210). The Findings of Fact fails to adequately explain
any reason for this reduced level income nor any reason for not providing the statutorily
required financial information. (Appellant's Brief pp. 36-44; Reply Brief pp. 14-17).
The amount of historical income that a party has generated can be disregarded by the
Trial Court only when there is clear evidence that the spouse can no longer earn this level of
income. Carolyn M. Endrodv v. Laszlo Endrody 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Jana
Griffith v. David G. Griffith 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (noting detailed Findings
of Fact were entered on the issues of any underemployment and the averaging of bonuses
paid over the past five (5) years). An abuse of discretion will be present where there are
inadequate Findings of Fact as to the financial issues, the income of the parties and the
failure to reference the statutory alimony factors that are required to be taken into account
by the Trial Court. Erin Jo Chambers v. Thomas D. Chambers 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). If the Trial Court fails to make these detailed Findings of Fact, then it has abused its
discretion as a matter of law.
-10-
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Adverse Inference Rule as a Matter of Law and was Clear Error by the Court.
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281-286,288-289). The Appellee at first denied, but eventually conceded, that the business
pays many of his personal li\ ing expenses such as: P "rent"\ (ii) "utilities"; (iii) "vacation
casr.
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income amounts are not shown on his personal financial declaration form. (Trial Exhibit
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No. 6; Addendum No. 12). These figures are actually deducted from his "estimated" income
of $ 1,800.00. This is the very situation that the adverse inference rule is intended to address.
(Divorce Trial pp. 253- 257). The Findings of Fact do not address this matter.
The Trial Court failed to properly apply the Adverse Inference Rule as a matter of law
or at least state why it was not proper in its Findings of Fact. This was clear error.
The Retroactive Vacating of the Alimony Award
Support was Improper as a Matter of Law.
The Appellee did not address and thus conceded the legal principle that a support
obligation becomes unalterable once it accrues whether it is a temporary order or otherwise.
The Appellee failed to cite any legal authority as to the nonapplication of UCA §30-310.6(1). The Trial Court merely declared (without any supporting Findings of Fact) the legal
conclusion that the temporary order was "improperly entered." (Record p. 1118; Findings
of Fact 1J40). The Findings of Fact are inadequate as a matter of law to support the legal
conclusion stated. Many of the Court's Findings of Fact are in actuality a legal conclusion.
Even if UCA §30-3-10.6(1) does not apply, then res judicata and the law of the case
doctrine prohibits the retroactive elimination of support when the request was heard on the
merits and then denied. Polly Plumb v. State of Utah 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990); Archie
Thurston v. Box Elder County 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995).
The failure to grant a judgment for the accrued spousal support is erroneous as a
matter of law, was contrary to case law, and was clear error. (Appellant's Brief pp. 49 -51).
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The Amount of AlimoHV te Be-Paid M'frGiven Case is a Matter of Discretion.
but this Discretion Must be Exercised Within Established Limits as a Matter of Law.
An A ppeals Court will usually review the Trial Court's determination of the
" •• tUt

'*•

ou;vcii N e i l B i c i u i i u i i \

.'ctn a.

Breinholt 905 P.2d 877' (Utah Ct. -s r» I995). Since the District Court failed to identify and
a Jdress the alimony factors in its I Hidings, including Mr. Miller's historical earnings ability;
arm icuicu u) apply the proper law, the rulings regarding alimony and child support are both
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The amount of alimony to be awarded in a given case is not fixed by a mathematical
i ;a contained in a statute or referenced in any gi\ en case. It is a matter of discretion for
in-, i iidi v on-* to deLcrniiiiv. m (he first instance. Glen P. Willey v. Rosalind A. Willey (II)
Sic yen N c u

(Utah Ct. App. 1995); Anthony >
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App, 1991). Tlic basic factors on which an award is to be based are partially set forth in
UCA §30-3-5(' ) )

I hese factors are also identified in the existing case law. These factors
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income and needs and the payor spouse's based upon on the same factors. (Appellant's Brief
pp. 43-48). Debbie A. Lee v. Dennis V. Lee 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Hugh P.
Kuiisam v. Janet L. Kun^ain • -^
-. .Mpi^ai
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> >} • ^87); Vera Morgan v. Wallace

'uaii Lamc> v. j^niersonEames 735 P 2d395

(Utah Ct. App. 1987); James Davis v. Penny A. Davis 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988).

-13-

In order to show that the Trial Court has properly exercised its discretion in the matter,
it must enter sufficient Findings of Fact so that the Appeals Court can determine if the
alimony ruling is rationally based upon the proper evidence and whether the court has
properly applied the governing law to those established facts. Michael J. Godfrey v. Maria
O. Godfrey 854 P.2d 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The Findings of Fact regarding alimony are insufficient as a matter of law and are
merely conclusionary. They fail to identify the critical or even the basic alimony factors.
They wholly fail to address Mr. Miller's historical income ability and why it was so
dramatically reduced by the time of the trial. In addition, the Trial Court fails to identify
specific facts as to why the temporary alimony was to be vacated in its entirety or even why
the Respondent could not pay any portion of it during the four (4) years the divorce was
pending. The Trial Court deviated from established case law on this subject and failed to
address the statutory factors for setting spousal and child support.
Where the Amount of Fees are Uncontested by Specific Evidence, then the
Full Amount Claimed Should be Awarded Absent Specific Findings
Supporting and Justifying the Reduction in the Total Amount Claimed.
Where the fee claim is supported by admissible and competent evidence and where
is not materially contested by an opposing party by specific evidence, then the Trial Court
must make specific findings in order to justify reducing the amount of the attorney's fee
claim. Govert Copier Painting v. Craig Van Leeuwen 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that the Trial Court must make specific Findings of Fact in order to reduce the total
fee claim); Bovd J. Brown v. David K. Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct. App. 109, 978 P.2d 470.
-14-
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articulated by the Trial Court, and more importantly, they must be appropriate under the facts
and the en vU»> ^IUIILC^ oi me case. 11 ^peutit facts are not present to justify the reduction in
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(Utah App.). There are no stated reasons for not awarding the full amount and no Findings
o ; jci were entered to explain the court*, rationale U>r u> (u n^ or even the process that it
engaued "
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At the time of trial, the month* j ^miiig statement had not yet been prepare
evidence is also clear that the fee claim was based upon contemporaneous records. (Divorce
. „. f .

- a JIIIILU ices were not factually challenged during the divorce trial.
in !:fi .11 $ s • : - :; :; • : :

claimed. The Trial Court ^ ruling o

deviates from the established case la

failure of the Trial Court to enter any specific Findings of Fact for not awarding costs 10 the
I>etitiorier is erroneous as a matter of law. (;\|,pLnam > Brief pp. 53-55).
-

II CONCLUSION

The court should withdraw the prior panel memorandum decision and gi ant a
rehearing on the case and include oral reargument of the appeal even if such is limited to
matters of la - • : i lly.
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426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Martha Pierce
Office of the Guardian ad Litem
450 South State Street, W-22
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

by delivery to the law offices at the parties as shown above, dated the 29th day of May, 2001.
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ORME, Judge;
As clarified at: or al ar g ui riei it, appellai it does not challenge
the propriety of the trial court's legal conclusions and decree
given the findings of fact it made. Rather, she challenges the
findings themselves as being clearly erroneous given the evidence
of record. The difficulty with this position is that while
appellant highlights in some detail the evidence which is
inconsistent with or undercuts the findings, she wholly fails to
marshal the evidence that supports the findings, which is the
mamdatory first step to mounting a successful challenge on appeal
to a trial court's findings of fact:
As we have previously
pxr] ained
- =•! 1 =mt
muse begin by undertaking the arduous and
painstaking marshaling process . . . .
After
marshaling the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings, [appellant] must then show
that these same findings are "so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of
the evidence,' thus making them clearly
erroneous." Mountain States Broadcasting v.
Neale, 783 P. 2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. AOXD . IS02;
(citations omitted

We do not take issue with [appellant's]
claim that [her] brief contains "extensive
quotations from the record." However, the
marshaling concept does not reflect a desire
to merely have pertinent excerpts from the
record readily available to a reviewing
court. The marshaling process is not unlike
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must
extricate himself or herself from the
client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly
discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must
be sufficient to convince the appellate court
that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.
"Appellants often overlook or disregard
this heavy burden." Id.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original). As we observed in
West Valley, "[w]e have shown no reluctance to affirm when the
appellant fails to adequately marshal the evidence." 818 P.2d at
1313.
Insofar as appellant's challenge to the court's contempt
rulings is focused on the court's findings, appellant again fails
to marshal the evidence in support of the findings, the
prerequisite to showing such evidence is legally insufficient to
support the findings. Moreover, in the context of the long and
tortured history of this case, we see no reversible error in the
procedure employed by the trial court in resolving the alleged
contempt or in the sanctions imposed. In particular, we believe
the obligations under the decree that appellant was found not to
have performed were sufficiently clear, especially in context,
that appellant must have known what was expected of her.
Appellee was not awarded attorney fees below and thus cannot
be awarded fees on appeal in accordance with the line of cases
typified by Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870, 875 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), and Moore v.
Moore, 872 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). While
unavailing, appellant's appeal was not frivolous, and thus
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. g l y , e a c h s i u c ondxa. J^CCIX m c i r own a i u u m e y
i n c u r r e d en a p p e a l .
Affirmed.
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Orme , Judge
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